Below you'll find a list of my academic and popular publications with links to view and download where possible.
We argue that the main results of scientific papers may appropriately be published even if they are false, unjustified, and not believed to be true or justified by their author. To defend this claim we draw upon the literature studying the norms of assertion, and consider how they would apply if one attempted to hold claims made in scientific papers to their strictures, as assertions and discovery claims in scientific papers seem naturally analogous. We first use a case study of William H. Bragg's early twentieth century work in physics to demonstrate that successful science has in fact violated these norms. We then argue that features of the social epistemic arrangement of science which are necessary for its long run success require that we do not hold claims of scientific results to their standards. We end by making a suggestion about the norms that it would be appropriate to hold scientific claims to, along with an explanation of why the social epistemology of science - considered as an instance of collective inquiry - would require such apparently lax norms for claims to be put forward.
I argue in this paper that collaborators do not, in fact, need to reach broad agreement over the justification of a consensus claim. This is because maintaining a diversity of justifiers within a scientific collaboration has important epistemic value. I develop a view of collective justification which depends on the diversity of epistemic perspectives present in a scientific group. I argue that a group can be collectively justified in asserting that P as long as the disagreement among collaborators over the reasons is [*]itself[*] justified. I outline two epistemic "mechanisms" which are sources of diversity of justifiers in a scientific collaboration. In conclusion, I make a case for multi-method collaborative research and work through an example in the social sciences.
* Awarded the [**]2018 Mary B. Hesse Graduate Student Essay Award[**] by the [Philosophy of Science Association](https://www.philsci.org/).
This paper addresses the problem of judgment aggregation in science. How should scientists decide which propositions to assert in a collaborative document? We distinguish the question of what to write in a collaborative document from the question of collective belief. We argue that recent objections to the application of the formal literature on judgment aggregation to the problem of judgment aggregation in science apply to the latter, not the former question. The formal literature has introduced various desiderata for an aggregation procedure. Proposition-wise majority voting emerges as a procedure that satisfies all desiderata which represent norms of science. An interesting consequence is that not all collaborating scientists need to endorse every proposition asserted in a collaborative document.